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DOES PARENTAL LIABILITY
FOR LEGAL FEES INFRINGE
UPON A JUVENILE'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
From its inception, the juvenile court system has tolerated a
wide range of differences between procedural rights afforded adults
and those afforded juveniles. The underlying distinction arose
because the early reformers were appalled by the application of adult
criminal procedures to juvenile proceedings. They set about to
create a system which would not be confined by the concept of
justice alone. The role of this system was not to ascertain the guilt
or innocence of the child but rather "What is he, how has he become
what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the
interest of the state to save him from his downward career."' These
results were to be achieved by insisting that the proceedings were
not adversary, but that the state was proceeding as parens patriae.
The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the child
the rights available to adults was asserted on the grounds that a
child, unlike an adult, has a right "not to liberty but to custody."
For example, a child can be made to attorn to his parents and to go
to school. If the parents default in their custodial functions the state
might intervene. In so doing, it would not deprive the child of any
rights, because he had none, but would merely provide the "custody"
to which the child was entitled.' The constitutional and theoretical
basis for this peculiar system is debatable, and in practice the results
have not been entirely satisfactory.4
A CHANGE IN THOUGHT
Finally in 1967 the landmark case of In re Gault' was decided
by the United States Supreme Court. The Court extended to juve-
1 Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HAv. L. REv. 104, 119-20 (1909).
2 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967). "Parens patriae-Father of his country;
parent of the country. In England, the king. In the United States, the state, as a
sovereign-referring to the sovereign power of guardianship over persons under dis-
ability." BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 1269 (4th ed. 1968).
8 "The basic right of a juvenile is not to liberty but to custody. He has a right
to have someone take care of him, and if his parents do not afford him this custodial
privilege, the law must do so." Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children's Courts,
48 A.B.A.J. 719, 720 (1962).
A "There is evidence . . . that there may be grounds for concern that the child
receives the worst of both worlds: That he gets neither the protections accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). See also Handler, The Juvenile Court
and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7.
5 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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niles constitutional rights and privileges which are afforded to adult
criminals. "It would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not
require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied
in the phrase 'due process.' Under our Constitution, the condition
of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."' Among the
rights which it extended to juveniles the Supreme Court especially
noted the importance of the right to counsel. The Court stated that
the juvenile needs the aid of counsel at every step in the proceedings
to deal with the problems of law, to make inquiry into the facts, to
ascertain whether the accused has a defense, and to prepare and
submit the defense if any exists.7 Moreover, a juvenile is entitled
to counsel to act in his behalf in any matter before juvenile court,
and where the child is indigent, counsel must be appointed.8 The
California Legislature has heeded this constitutional mandate by
enacting section 634 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. This
statute gives the court the power to appoint counsel for indigent
minors. It also creates in the court a duty to appoint counsel if the
minor appears at the hearing without one, whether he is indigent or
not, unless he has intelligently waived this right.9
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECTIONS 634 AND 903.1
The appointment of counsel for an indigent minor raises the
question whether or not the parents are liable for counsel fees.',
Section 634 authorizes the court to determine the financial status of
the parents and allows the court to assess a charge upon them for
legal fees.
Rule 39 of the MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE COURT" is strik-
6 Id. at 27-28.
7 Id. at 36.
8 Id. at 41; In re Dennis M., 70 A.C. 460, 450 P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
9 CAL. WEIs . & INST'NS CODE § 634 (West Supp. 1970) provides:
When it appears to the court that the minor or his parent or guardian desires
counsel but is unable to afford and cannot for that reason employ counsel, the
court may appoint counsel. In any case in which the minor is alleged to be a
person described in Section 601 or 602, he shall be represented by counsel and
the court shall appoint counsel for the minor if the minor or his parent or
guardian desires counsel but is unable to afford and cannot for that reason
employ counsel, unless there is an intelligent waiver of the right of counsel
by the minor.
10 Id. § 634: "If the parent or guardian does not furnish counsel and the court
determines that such parent or guardian has the ability to pay, the court shall appoint
counsel at the expense of the parent or guardian."
11 COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NATIONAL CoUNcIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY,
MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS, § 39 (1969) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RULE
391:
The parties may be represented by counsel retained by them in all pro-
ceedings. The court shall appoint counsel for the parties if it finds that they
are indigent unless representation is completely and intelligently waived.
Waiver by a child may be made only in the presence of his parents, guardian
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ingly similar to section 634 and provides a good vehicle for a thresh-
old inquiry into the legislative intent and policy considerations
behind section 634. Rule 39 allows the court to appoint counsel upon
its own motion or at the request of an indigent party, or where it
deems this necessary to prevent a conflict of interest between parent
and child.' 2 In any event, if the parents have the financial ability to
pay the legal fees they can be ordered to pay.'3 Commenting on
Rule 39, the author of the MODEL RULES stated that requiring
financially able parents to pay can be justified on the theory that
counsel is a necessity of life which parents must provide.' 4 The
Council stated that legal services are as much a necessity of life as
food, shelter, clothing and medical care, in which case counsel fees
are better borne by the parents than by society."
California Welfare and Institutions Code section 634 is the
equivalent of Rule 39. Enacted in 1937, section 634 in its early
form authorized the court to provide an indigent with an attorney
if he was charged with misconduct which would amount to a felony
if committed by an adult. 8 The 1967 amendment 17 eliminated the
"equivalent of a felony" clause and added a provision requiring ap-
pointment of counsel both for children within the ambit of section
60118 and section 602.1 The 1968 amendment' ° added a clause
allowing the court to determine whether the parents are financially
able to pay for attorney's fees and to charge them with the fees if
they are capable.
Section 903.1,21 passed in 1965, remains in its original form. It
or custodian.
Upon request or on its own motion the court shall appoint separate
counsel to represent any indigent party other than the child if the interests
of the child and those of the party appear to conflict. The court shall appoint
counsel for the child if, in its opinion, the interests of the child and those
of his parents conflict or if counsel is necessary to meet the requirements
of a fair hearing.
Where the court appoints counsel under the provisions of this rule, it
may, where appropriate, assess against the parents, guardian, or custodian,
including any agent vested with the legal custody of the child, the costs of
providing such counsel. Orders assessing the costs of counsel may be enforced
through contempt proceedings....
12 MODEL RULE 39, f[ 2.
18 MODEL RULE 39, 1 3.
14 CouNcrr OF JUDGEs OF T=E NATIONAL CouNcIL ON CRmIE An DELINQUENCY,
MODEL RULEs POR JuvENniE COURTS, at 83 (1969).
15 Id.
1B Cal. Stats. ch. 369 § 634, at 1025 (1937).
17 Cal. Stats. ch. 1355 § 4, at 3193 (1967). This was an obvious attempt to com-
ply with the mandate of In re Gault.
18 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 601 (West 1966) deals with children beyond
the control of parents.
19 Id. § 602 deals with delinquent children.
20 Cal. Stats. ch. 1223 § 1, at 2332 (1968).
21 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 903.1 (West 1966).
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allows the county to charge relatives, liable for the support of a
minor, with fees for legal services rendered to a minor by the public
defender or a private attorney.2 The combined meaning of sections
634 and 903.1 is unclear.' Presumably section 903.1 operates to
give the county, independent of the juvenile court, authority to
charge relatives for the fees. However, a prior determination by the
court of the financial status of responsible relatives would be con-
trolling on the county.
Parents' liability under sections 634 and 903.1 seems to arise
from two principles :24 First, California feels that legal services are
a necessity of life to be provided by parents; 2" second, the cost to
the state should be minimized whenever possible. 6 While such
intents and purposes are commendable, they may cut across certain
constitutional rights guaranteed to children facing the juvenile court.
In practice section 634 allows the court to appoint counsel if the
child's parents are unable to afford one and also if for some other
reason the parents do not obtain counsel for the child.27 Further-
more, an inquiry is authorized to determine whether the parents are
financially able to pay for an attorney.2 s If the parents are finan-
cially able, the county can charge them with the costs of legal
services.29
Although these sections allow reimbursement, not all counties
in California utilize them for the purpose of reimbursement. The
Los Angeles County Public Defender's Office, the state's largest,
does not utilize them, contending that sections 634 and 903.1 may
violate constitutional rights. 0 Moreover, the Los Angeles office also
22 Id. "The father, mother, spouse, or other person liable for the support of a
minor person . . . shall be liable for the cost to the county of legal services rendered
to the minor by the public defender . . . or for the cost to the county for the legal
services rendered to the minor by private attorney .... "
23 CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION Or THE BAR, REVIEW OF SELECTED 1968
CODE LEGISLATION 364 (1968).
24 Comment, 3 CAL. WEST L. REV. 134, 139 (1967); See County of Alameda
v. Espinoza, 243 Cal. App. 2d 534, 52 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1966). See also CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 196 (West 1954).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 634 (West Supp. 1970): "When it appears to
the court that the minor or his parent or guardian desires counsel but is unable to
afford and cannot for that reason employ counsel, the court may appoint counsel....
If the parent or guardian does not furnish counsel . . . the court shall appoint
counsel . ... "
28 Id. § 634: "If the parent or guardian does not furnish counsel and the court
determines that such parent or guardian has the ability to pay, the court shall ap-
point counsel at the expense of the parent or guardian."
29 CAL. WELP. & INST'NS CODE § 903.1 (West 1966).
80 Telephone interview with Kathryn J. McDonald, Head Deputy Public De-
fender of the Juvenile Court for Los Angeles County Public Defender's Office, Feb.
20, 1970.
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reasons that the above sections are in conflict with California Gov-
ernment Code section 27706,"' which specifies the duties of a public
defender. The Los Angeles Public Defender's Office reasons that the
person being defended is the juvenile, not his parents. Therefore,
unless he has his own funds, the court and the Public Defender's
Office will not pursue any course of action to gain reimbursement. 2
In contrast to Los Angeles County, Santa Clara County applies and
utilizes sections 634 and 903.1 to impose a fee, even though min-
imal.33
In counties where the sections are utilized instances have arisen
where juveniles have refused the aid of the public defender solely
on the grounds that their parents would have to pay for the legal
fees. 84 Public Defender interviews also reveal that juveniles refuse
counsel out of fear of parental reprisal" as well as the apprehension
that they themselves would be forced to pay the costs.30
31 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27706 (West 1968) provides: "The public defender shall
perform the following duties: (a) Upon request of the defendant or upon the order
of the court, he shall defend, without expense to the defendant, any person who is
not financially able to employ counsel and who is charged with the commission of
any contempt or offense triable in the superior, municipal or justice courts at all stages
of the proceedings, including the preliminary examination.
"(e) Upon request of the court, he shall represent any person who is entitled to be
represented by counsel but is not financially able to employ counsel in proceedings
under chapter 2 (commencing with section 500) of part I of Division 2 of the Wel-
fare and Institutions Code when such proceedings are concerned with a person alleged
to be or who has been found to be within the description of Sections 601 or 602 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code."
3 Telephone interview with Kathryn J. McDonald, Head Deputy Public De-
fender of the Juvenile Court for the Los Angeles County Public Defender's Office,
Feb. 20, 1970.
33 Telephone interview with Frank Katz, Deputy Public Defender for Santa Clara
County, Feb. 19, 1970, revealed that when a Public Defender is appointed to ajuvenile, at the close of the hearing the Public Defender submits a recommendation
whether the parents should be charged or not. The fee is based upon a set scale
established by the Public Defender's Office in accordance with the average time re-
quired for such cases. The fee for an uncontested case is about $38.00. The fee for
a contested case is about $55.00 plus an hourly rate for every hour over the average
time.
34 In re R. D. H., 1 Crim. no. 14091 ('Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 4, 1970); telephone
interviews with Frank Katz and James King, Feb. 19, 1970.
85 See note 33 supra. Mr. Katz related at least two instances where juveniles
refused his assistance because they feared that their parents would be overburdened
and angered.
36 Interview with James M. King, interviewer for the Santa Clara County Public
Defender's Office, Feb. 21, 1970, in which Mr. King related an incident wherein a
juvenile was reluctant to accept his services. The juvenile had been in trouble before
and his parents were forced to pay detention costs. He was forced to work for his
parents without pay until he had reimbursed them for their expenditures. The child
feared this same exaction of recompense if he exercised his right to an attorney.
Mr. King also supported Mr. Katz with a similar account of a juvenile who
refused assistance solely on the grounds of fear of parental reprisal.
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The following questions will be discussed within the scope of
this comment: First, do sections 634 and 903.1 constitute an impedi-
ment to the free exercise by an indigent minor of the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel? Second, do sections 634 and 903.1 deny the
minor equal protection of the law, since they burden him and his
class without any corresponding burden on the indigent adult who
receives the aid of a public defender? Third, is a juvenile's voluntary
waiver of his right to counsel affected by the interaction of 634 and
903.1?37
PROBLEMS PRESENTED
Impediment to the Free Exercise of a Constitutional Right
In certain situations, a problem of impediment to a juvenile's
free exercise of the right to counsel may arise. When a child is con-
fronted with the choice of having an attorney represent him or not,
even the slightest amount of outside influence can be determinative.
The effects of sections 634 and 903.1 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code may create just this type of influence.
In re R. D. H.38 is an excellent example of the adverse effect
of these statutes on a juvenile's exercise of his right to counsel. The
petitioner in this case was arrested for burglary. He was informed
of his rights and told that if he desired counsel his parents might be
charged with legal fees under sections 634 and 903.1. His parents
were already indebted to the county because of his prior detentions
at juvenile hall and the county rehabilitation facility. He waived
his right to counsel in light of the statute. The trial court accepted
this waiver, found the petitioner guilty and committed him to the
California Youth Authority facility in Stockton. While these statutes
did not infringe directly upon the child's right to counsel, this author-
ity for billing the parents coupled with the fear of parental reprisal
impinged upon the exercise of that right.
The argument proposed by the petitioner, R. D. H., is that
sections 634 and 903.1 have a "chilling effect" on the exercise of
the right to counsel. The law is not without precedent on this point.
In United States v. Jackson,39 the Supreme Court struck down the
Federal Kidnapping Act provision permitting assessment of the
death penalty where a plea of not guilty was tried by a jury. The
Court stated that the objectives of Congress "cannot be pursued by
37 See generally brief for Petitioner, In re R. D. H., 1 Crim. no. 14091 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 4, 1970).
38 In re R. D. H., 1 Crim. no. 14091 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 4, 1970).
89 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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means which needlessly chill the exercise of a basic constitutional
right."do The question is not whether the chilling effect is
"incidental" rather than "intentional"; the question is whether the
effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive ...
[T]he evil in the federal statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty
pleas and jury waivers but simply that it needlessly encourages them !41
This language implies a position that a statute need not be
inherently coercive to render it an impermissible burden on the
exercise of a constitutional right. Sections 634 and 903.1 seem to
meet this classification of statutes which do not blatantly coerce a
waiver of counsel but do encourage the waiver..
In re Allen,42 a case decided by the California Supreme Court,
expresses a similar view. In Allen the petitioner was placed on pro-
bation following her plea of guilty to possession of dangerous drugs.
Reimbursement to the county for the cost of court-appointed counsel
was a condition of that probation. In a unanimous decision the court
held that this condition had a "chilling effect" on the free exercise
of the sixth amendment right to counsel. Even though she was de-
fended by counsel, the court was concerned about the effect of such
conditions upon others who may need counsel. Other defendants
might refuse counsel if they knew there was a possibility that they
would have to pay for legal fees as a condition of probation.3
Clearly, while sections 634 and 903.1 do not directly inhibit
the child's free exercise of the right to counsel, they do indirectly
but substantially chill free exercise of that right. Opponents of this
view could argue that the rationale of Jackson and Allen is not
applicable to sections 634 and 903.1. Both cases involve adult
offenders and, thus, the fact situations would be distinguishable.
In Allen the petitioner was directly burdened with reimbursing the
county. Under sections 634 and 903.1 there would be no direct
burden placed upon the child; rather the burden would be directly
on the parents. This liability would be applicable only when the
40 Id. at 582.
41 Id. at 582-83; accord, Pope v. United States, 392 U.S. 651 (1968) ; Alford v.
North Carolina, 405 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1968).
42 71 A.C. 409, 455 P.2d 143, 78 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1969).
43 Id. at 411, 455 P.2d at 144, 78 'Cal. Rptr. at 208.
"Although in the instant case there is no indication in the record that petitioner
was discouraged from exercising her constitutional right to counsel for, in fact she
requested and received counsel, neither does the record show that she was forewarned
of the possibility that she might become indebted to the county for the cost of such
service. The fact that such knowledge might have deterred her and could well deter
others, gives rise to our concern ...." Id.
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parents would be able to pay." Therefore, since there would be no
direct burden on the child, the statutes would not interfere with his
exercise of the right to counsel.45
Parental attitude and behavior are predominant motives for
the actions of the child. This influence may so affect the child that
he will waive his constitutional right to counsel. By charging the
parents under sections 634 and 903.1, the government is penalizing
the exercise of a constitutional right. The government is without
authority to create such a burden.46
Denial of Equal Protection
A. The Child' Sections 634 and 903.1 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code classify children according to family wealth. A
child from a poor family is afforded counsel under 634 at no charge
to the parents. Obviously, if the parents are not going to be charged,
then no obstacle impedes the child in his exercise of the right to
counsel. Similarly, if the child comes from a family with substantial
means, in most cases the parents will retain private counsel or
simply pay the court assessed fees for appointed counsel. Not so
happy, however, are the children from families whose wealth is
marginal. Such families can technically "afford" appointed counsel,
but the charge imposes a financial hardship. Here the economic
pressure to waive counsel mounts and children from this class are
likely to succumb to this pressure. It is this class into which the
Santa Clara County cases and instances47 fall which clearly estab-
lish that sections 634 and 903.1 do in fact classify children on the
basis of family wealth.
A state can, consistent with the fourteenth amendment, provide
for differences so long as this does not amount to a denial of due
process or an "invidious discrimination."48 "Absolute equality is
not required; lines can be and are drawn.149 However, a monetary
44 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 700 (West Supp. 1970).
45 But see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967), citing Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S.
596, 599 (1947), wherein the court states:
"[Wihen as here, a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is before us, special
care . . .must be used. . . .He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of
maturity. That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and
overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the period of instability which the crisis
of adolescence produces."
46 See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570 (1968).
47 See notes 29-31 & 33 supra.
48 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
49 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
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basis of distinction has long been held inadequate to justify discrim-
ination .5
An argument may be made to the effect that monetary dis-
crimination has normally been restricted to cases where the poor
have been denied equal treatment under the law. Under section 634
it is the class that is too wealthy to be poor but too poor to be
financially independent that is discriminated against. The under-
lying policy of freedom from impediments on basic constitutional
rights should still be applicable. That, in this instance, it is this lower
middle income group and not the poor that is effected is immaterial.
Section 634 violates the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment in another way. Adult criminals are given free
counsel if the court finds that they are indigent. In so doing, the
court looks only to the financial status of the defendant. A juvenile's
right to free appointment, however, is effectively conditioned upon
the financial status of his parents under 634 and 903.1. With respect
to this right, juveniles are classified apart from adults when the
court charges the parents for appointed counsel.
In re L. G. T.5' is a Florida case in which a fourteen-year-old
was denied the benefit of an insolvency statute and was required
to pay the cost of his appeal on the grounds that his parents had
the financial ability to pay. On appeal the court held that a juvenile,
destitute in his own right, may not be denied benefit of an insolvency
statute because of the financial status of his parents.52 In reaching
its decision the court recognized the principles mandated in the
Gault case. It stated that Gault protected the constitutional rights
of a juvenile "notwithstanding the non-criminal nature of the pro-
ceedings." 53
In California, contrary to the law of Florida,54 legal fees appear
to be a necessity of life which must be provided by the parents.55
While such a common law or statutory duty may exist, it cannot
deny to juveniles their basic constitutional rights.
50 Id. See also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
51 216 So. 2d 54 (Fla. App. 1968).
52 Id. at 56.
"As is made clear by our decisions, the test on an inquiry of insolvency is not
what the prisoner's friends or relatives have the ability to do in paying costs, or
their readiness or willingness to pay them. The test is whether the defendant, him-
self, has the ability to pay the costs or to secure their payment." Id.
53 Id. at 55.
54 Id. at 56.
"[P]arents' common law duty to furnish necessities to minor children does not
extend to the furnishing of legal services and costs incident to an appeal." Id.
55 See note 24 supra.
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B. The Parents. Since parents are the ones named to bear the
costs of legal fees, the issue of the effects on their constitutional
rights is important. Rehabilitation is the main function of the
juvenile court system. 56 A secondary function, the protection of
society from delinquents, is also served. Since appointment of coun-
sel is an important part of this system, every member of society
should share equally in the costs of appointment of an attorney
for an indigent juvenile, just as they do for indigent adults.57
Two leading cases, Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley5"
and Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner,59 support the argu-
ment that to charge a specified class of people for costs of services
which benefit society denies equal protection under the law. The
statute attacked was based on consanguinity. This statute 0 imposed
an obligation upon the relatives to pay the costs of maintenance of
a mentally ill person committed to a state hospital. In both cases
the defendants claimed that the statute denied them equal protection
under the law. The California Supreme Court accepted this defense
and overturned the statute on grounds of denial of equal protec-
tion.61 Although these cases should support the unconstitutionality
of sections 634 and 903.1, two later cases, County of Alameda v.
Espinoza2 and In re Shaieb 3 distinguish them. They dealt with
parents who were charged for costs of maintenance and support
pursuant to section 903.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The
facts were similar in both cases. A child was sent to a county re-
habilitation center pursuant to an order from the juvenile court. The
parents relied upon Hawley and Kirchner and claimed section 903.1
denied them equal protection under the law. The court in Espinoza
held that there is a rational basis for charging parents with the
costs of detention pursuant to juvenile court order. 4 In re Shaieb,
agreeing with Espinoza, held Hawley and Kirchner do not apply
to juvenile court situations. 5
56 TASK FORCE REPORT, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, 85 (1967).
57 Cf. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 38 U.S.L.W. 4230 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1970).
58 59 Cal. 2d 247, 379 P.2d 22, 28 'Cal. Rptr. 718 (1963).
59 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1964).
60 Cal. Stats. ch. 1667 § 36.5, at 4107 (1967).
61 Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley, 59 Cal. 2d 247, 379 P.2d 22, 28
Cal. Rptr. 718 (1963).
"The mere fact that innocent persons are relatives of an accused or convicted
person does not deprive them of their fundamental rights or constitute a lawful basis
for a statute or judgment whereby their property may be taken to pay costs of
prosecuting, detaining, or otherwise treating the accused." Id. at 256, 379 P.2d at 28,
28 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
02 243 Cal. App. 2d 534, 52 'Cal. Rptr. 480 (1966).
63 250 Cal. App. 2d 553, 58 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1967).
64 County of Alameda v. Espinoza, 243 Cal. App. 2d 534, 549, 52 Cal. Rptr. 480,
489-90 (1966).
05 In re Shaieb, 250 Cal. App. 2d 553, 557, 58 Cal. Rptr. 631, 633 (1967).
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Arguably, under Espinoza and Shaieb there is a rational basis
for imposing juvenile detention costs on parents without discrimina-
tion. The basis can be extended to the imposition of appointed
counsel fees as well. Even though sections 634 and 903.1 may be
constitutional as applied to parents, the fact that they are constitu-
tional as to parents cannot serve to justify violating the basic rights
of the child.66
Effect on Voluntary Waiver
The final issue presented by sections 634 and 903.1 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code concerns an aspect of the voluntary
waiver of the right to counsel. A valid waiver must be voluntary,
intelligent and knowing. 7 In a juvenile hearing the waiver of counsel
can be made only if the juvenile has an intelligent understanding of
its consequences.68 Seemingly, there is much support for the proposi-
tion that a minor is incapable of competently and intelligently waiv-
ing his constitutional rights.6 9 In People v. Lara,7° the California
Supreme Court gave an exhaustive discourse on the subject of the
intelligibility of a minor's waiver of counsel. The Lara concept of
"totality of circumstances" has been accepted and expounded upon
in later cases.71 In In re H. L. R.72 a minor was taken into custody,
with the consent of his father, for appearing to be under the influence
of drugs. The boy was questioned by a friend of the family, who
happened to be a deputy probation officer. The boy waived his rights
and talked with his "friend." In addition to being under the influence
of drugs the boy was exhausted. Despite the officer's appraisal that
the boy understood his rights, the court held that the waiver given
was not an intelligent one under the "totality of circumstances"
existent.78
Since the "totality of circumstances" is the proper test, it
follows that the problem must be handled on a case-by-case basis.
66 See 'Comment, 3 CAL. WEST. L. REV., 134 (1967), for further treatment of the
parents' equal protection argument. See also Department of Mental Hygiene v. Bank
of America N.T. & S.A., 3 Cal. App. 3d 543, 83 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1969).
67 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
68 In re Butterfield, 253 Cal. App. 2d 794, 61 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1967).
69 Comment, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1711 (1968); Comment, 19 HASTINGS L. REV.
223, 227-28 (1967) ; Comment, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW. 114, 127 (1966) ; Comment, 40
WASH. L. REV. 189, 200-01 (1965).
70 67 Cal. 2d 365, 423 P.2d 202 (1967).
71 In re H. L. R., 269 Cal. App. 2d 610, 75 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1969) ; In re Dennis
M., 70 A.C. 460, 450 P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
72 269 Cal. App. 2d 610, 75 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1969).
78 See generally In re Dennis M., 70 A.C. 460, 450 P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1969).
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A minor cannot be judged by adult standards. 74 Because of the
effect of sections 634 and 903.1, instances have arisen where parents
have made threats or reprimands to keep their children from bur-
dening them with legal fees.7 With this in mind, the child must make
a choice to accept or waive counsel. Under such circumstances the
waiver is not freely given.
The test presented in the above cases concerns the intelligiblity
of waiver and not the voluntariness of waiver. However, the same
test must be applied to voluntariness since this concept is so closely
related to intelligibility of waiver.
CONCLUSION
The juvenile is a constitutionally privileged member of society.76
The rights extended by Gault are as important to minors as they are
to adults. The financial responsibility provisions of sections 634 and
903.1 are a burden upon these rights and should be considered as
impediments to our progress in the protection of juveniles. The
effects of these sections read together violate due process and deny
equal protection.
Impediments which chill the free exercise of a basic constitu-
tional right are impermissible burdens. 77 Sections 634 and 903.1
produce a "chilling effect" on the exercise of the right to counsel.
These sections, therefore, are unconstitutional burdens upon the
minor's right to counsel.
Statutes which cause a discriminatory classification are un-
constitutional.78 Sections 634 and 903.1 produce an arbitrary and
discriminatory classification based upon financial status of the
minor's parents. Plainly, the effects of sections 634 and 903.1 deny
equal protection of the law to the child and should be carefully
scrutinized.
Although there is a rational basis for imposing liability upon
the parents, this basis can only protect the statutes from being
attacked as a denial of equal protection to the parents. This rational
basis cannot justify the violation of a juvenile's basic constitutional
right to counsel.
Finally, waiver of a constitutional right by a minor must be
74 See note 45 supra.
75 See notes 29-31 & 33 supra.
76 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
77 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582-83 (1968).
78 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963).
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considered within the "totality of circumstances" test.7 9 Considering
all circumstances the waiver must be voluntary, intelligent and
knowing.80 Otherwise, it is not a valid waiver. When a child waives
a right, not for his own interest but for the interest of his parents,
it is not a voluntary waiver. Sections 634 and 903.1 produce this
effect and must not be allowed to continue in this fashion.
All these factors when considered together throw deep suspicion
on the constitutional validity of sections 634 and 903.1 of the Wel-
fare and Institutions Code. While the legislature's desire to shift the
burden of remunerating court-appointed counsel from society to the
parents is commendable, it cannot be justified so long as it acts as
an impedient on a juvenile's free exercise of the right to counsel. The
Supreme Court of California should review these sections in an ap-
propriate case and curtail the enforcement of them when they man-
ifestly jeopardize the rights of the very children the juvenile court
system attempts to protect.81
Martin N. Lettunich
79 County of Alameda v. Espinoza, 243 Cal. App. 2d 534, 549, 52 'Cal. Rptr. 480,
489-90 (1966).
80 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
81 On May 5, 1970, the California Supreme Court upheld the lower court ruling
in the case of In re R. D. H., 1 Crim. no. 14091 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 4, 1970). See
text at 352, supra. The court apparently also upheld the constitutionality of these
sections, but at the time this issue went to press the full opinion was not available.
Sacramento Legal Press, May 5, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
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